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Fear and guilt in proposers: Using emotions to explain
offers in ultimatum bargaining
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1Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, The Netherlands; 2Department of Social and
Organizational Psychology, University of Groningen, The Netherlands; 3Department of Social and
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Abstract
We argue that offers in bargaining are guided by the emotions that proposers anticipate when contemplating their offers. In
particular, we reason that positive offers may be driven by fear and guilt, where fear is more related to the perceived consequences
of having one’s offer rejected, and guilt is more related to concerns for the opponents’ outcomes. Two studies on ultimatum
bargaining corroborate this view. In Study 1, we used two well-documented manipulations to affect the consequences of having
one’s offer rejected and the initial entitlements of one’s opponent. Both factors affected offers: Offers were higher when the
consequences of having one’s offer rejected were lower, and when the initial entitlements of one’s opponent were higher. In
agreement with our predictions, the former effect was mediated by anticipated fear and the latter by anticipated guilt. In Study 2,
we directly manipulated both mediators. The findings further corroborate our reasoning by showing that both feelings also have a
direct effect on ultimatum offers. These findings highlight the potential contribution of studying specific emotions in bargaining
behavior. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The assumption of self-interest that is central to the economic
perspective on human behavior (e.g., Kahneman, 2003) seems
to be consistently violated by research on ultimatum
bargaining (for overviews see Güth & Tietz, 1990; Camerer
& Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1995). Ultimatum bargaining (Güth,
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) models the final step of
negotiations in which a proposer offers a proportion of some
commodity to a responder who decides to accept it or reject it.
If accepted, the commodity is distributed as proposed. If
rejected, both parties end up empty handed. Standard
economic theory predicts that people should offer and accept
the minimal positive amount. Yet findings show that proposers
tend to make offers of about 30–40% of the total endowment,
with a 50–50 split being the mode. This has spurred numerous
empirical attempts to psychologically explain this behavior.
At first these outcomes were understood to indicate that
proposers ‘‘often rely on what they consider a fair result’’
(Güth et al., 1982, p. 243). However, subsequent research
indicated that proposers might also make such high offers
because they expect that low offers will be rejected and that by
making low offers they run the risk of ending up with nothing
(e.g., Straub &Murnighan, 1995; Kagel, Kim, &Moser, 1996;
Fellner & Güth, 2003). This suggests that high offers do not
necessarily reflect a concern for others, but may be instigated
by a concern for rejection, hence for the own outcome. Both
concerns are invoked to explain outcomes of social
interactions involving elements of negotiations (e.g., McClin-
tock, 1972; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989;
Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Blount, 1995; Messick, 1995; De
Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).
The typical approach in studies that try to assess the impact of
concerns for others or for rejection is to introduce variations of
the standard ultimatumgameand assesswhether thesevariations
affect the offers made by proposers (e.g., Fellner & Güth, 2003;
Leliveld, van Dijk, & van Beest, 2008; van Dijk, van Kleef,
Steinel, & van Beest, 2008). This approach, with its focus on
offers, has yielded important insights. Still, we argue in the
following that this approach is unlikely to yield consensus
regarding the contribution of concerns for others or for rejection
becauseoffer size is an inherently ambiguous indexofproposers’
motives. We believe it is more fruitful to study psychological
variables that reveal the process underlying ultimatum game
decisions and that can be measured and manipulated directly.
Hereto, we will draw attention to the impact of (anticipated)
emotions on ultimatum offers, and outline how they may be
related to proposers’ motives in ultimatum bargaining.
Invisible Concerns
As stated, in the traditional ultimatum game, high offers can be
the result of concerns for the outcomes of others but also of
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concerns for rejection of the own outcome. Studies in which
the consequences of rejection were diminished suggest that a
concern for rejection leads to high offers (e.g., Fellner & Güth,
2003; van Dijk et al., 2008). For example, Fellner and Güth
(2003) varied the consequences of having one’s offer rejected
by the l game. In this version of the ultimatum game, the
consequences of rejection vary by a multiplication factor (l)
that determines the payoffs to proposers and responders in case
of rejection. In case of rejection, responders receive the
suggested payoff multiplied by (1!l), while proposers receive
the suggested payoff multiplied by l. Thus, as l decreases, the
consequences having one’s offer rejected become more severe
to the proposer. In agreement with the notion that people make
high offers out of a concern for the own outcome, results
indicated that offers were higher when the consequences of
rejection for one’s own outcome were increased (i.e., when l
went down).
Whereas these findings suggest that high offers may be
rooted in a concern for rejection of the own outcome, other
studies have suggested that high offers may also result from a
concern for other’s outcomes. For example, in a recent study,
Leliveld et al. (2008) manipulated initial ownership to
introduce two new versions of the ultimatum game: The
giving and the taking ultimatum game. Both games differ from
the traditional ultimatum game in that the initial ownership of
money is altered. In the giving ultimatum, the proposer owns
the money that is to be distributed. In the taking ultimatum, the
recipient owns the money. This simple change strongly
affected offers in the sense that proposers allocated more of the
money to the recipient in the taking game than in the giving
game. As responders were perceived as more entitled to the
money in a taking ultimatum (cf. Leliveld et al., 2008),
proposers felt it was inappropriate to make low offers,
indicative of an enhanced concern for the other’s outcome in
the taking game. Other research also indicates that proposers
do well by taking the perceived fairness of their offers into
account. Responders are willing to destroy a portion of their
endowments rather than having this taken away by the
proposer (Bosman, Sutter, & van Winden, 2005; Bosman &
van Winden, 2002). At the same time, responders are also
willing to accept offers at personal cost as long as they consider
the proposal to be fair (Nelissen & van Someren, 2009).
Using different variations of the ultimatum game, the
results of previous research suggest that when making offers,
proposers anticipate what would happen if they would make a
(too) low offer. The studies on the l game suggest that people
anticipate the consequences of having a low offer rejected; the
studies on the taking and giving ultimatum game suggest that
proposers anticipate the consequences of a low offer for their
opponent. Still, the studies cited here did not yet reveal
conclusive evidence for the underlying process. This prevents
conclusions pertaining the proposers’ motives based on the
size of the offer.
Anticipated Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining
Revealing the underlying process is of course not an easy task.
One way to try and reveal this process would be to directly ask
people why they did what they did. However, such a direct
question may prove ineffective. First of all, because constructs
like furthering the own outcome or the outcomes of others may
be considered rather abstract and to some even as a
hypothetical constructs given that in bargaining, own and
other’s interests may to some extent coincide. Second, because
people may, for example, be reluctant to say or admit that they
put their own interests first. Finally, people may not have direct
insight into the motives underlying their behavior. To shed
more light on the underlying process, we decided to take a
closer look at the role of anticipated emotions.
Functional theories of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Gross,
1999) acknowledge that distinct emotional states (e.g., fear)
are associated with specific, implicit goals (e.g., to avoid risk)
and action tendencies (e.g., running away) to accomplish this
goal (cf. Arnold, 1960; Plutchik, 1980; Frijda, 1986; Roseman,
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Taken to the domain of bargaining,
these insights suggest that bargaining strategies with different
objectives may be driven by different emotions. A few studies
have already established influences of specific emotions on
offers in ultimatum bargaining. Anticipating regret (Zeelen-
berg & Beattie, 1997), and experiencing gratitude (Tsang,
2006) or guilt (Ketelaar & Au, 2003) resulted in higher offers.
For the current purposes, we are, however, primarily interested
in the emotions that may reveal to what extent high offers are
related to a concern that low offers would be rejected, and a
concern that low offers would be inappropriate. Therefore, fear
and guilt merit special attention as they are the only two
emotions that specifically and directly relate to the motives that
are assumed to be intrinsic to decisions in the ultimatum game.
Fear is likely to be related to the concern that low offers will
be rejected because fear is associated with an implicit goal to
avoid personal risk (cf. Roseman et al., 1994), which is the risk
of rejection in an ultimatum game (cf. Zeelenberg & Beattie,
1997). So, we argue that the prospect of having their offers
rejected elicits anticipated fear in proposers, which results in
more generous offers to avoid rejection.
Unlike fear, guilt is a moral emotion that arises in response
to the concerns and interests of others (Haidt, 2003). The
distinction between decisions induced by guilt and by fear is
best illustrated by Frank (1988, p.300), who asks us to
‘‘Consider [...] a person capable of strong guilt feelings. This
person will not cheat even when it is in her material interest to
do so. The reason is not that she fears getting caught but that
she simply does not want to cheat.’’ Indeed, guilt inhibits
selfish tendencies in social interactions and induces behavior
to repair harm that was caused to another person (e.g., Ketelaar
& Au, 2003; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007;
Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007). So, we argue that the
prospect of making inadequate offers elicits anticipated guilt in
proposers, which results in more generous offers to avoid an
unfair outcome.
Overview of the Present Studies
To test the potential contributions of fear and guilt to
ultimatum bargaining, we first investigated if these emotions
could help to explain the previously listed effects of well-
known situational variations in the ultimatum game. In Study
1, we tested if anticipated fear serves as a mediator of the
effects on ultimatum offers of situational variations that
supposedly affect concerns for rejection. We also tested if
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 78–85 (2011)
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anticipated guilt served as a mediator of the effects on
ultimatum offers of situational variations that supposedly
affect concerns for others. In Study 2, we induced fear or guilt
in participants and observed whether both emotions also have
direct effects on proposers’ offers that mirror those of
manipulations that presumably enhance concerns for rejection
and concerns for others.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we used the previously described paradigms related
to concerns for rejection of the own outcome (the l manipula-
tion) and concerns for others’ outcomes (the manipulation of
initial ownership). In line with previous findings, we expected
offers to decreasewith decreasing l values, which determine the
proposers’ outcome. Furthermore, if the lmanipulation indeed
affects concerns for rejection of the own outcome, then
anticipated fear of rejection should mediate the effect of the l
manipulation. Additionally, we expected higher offers in a
taking than in a giving ultimatum (cf. Leliveld et al., 2008). If the
manipulation of initial ownership in fact increases concerns for
others, higher levels of anticipated guilt for making unfair offers
should drive this effect.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 119 undergraduate psychology students
(83% female, Mage" 21.2 years, SD" 1.83) who completed
questionnaires about hypothetical ultimatum game decisions
after a lecture. The study had a 2 (l: High/l" 0.9 vs. low/
l" 0.1)# 2 (initial ownership: Responder/taking vs. proposer/
giving) between subjects design. Participants were randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions.
Ultimatum Offers
Participants were asked to imagine that they were paired with
someone else with whom they had to divide 100 Euros. In the
giving ultimatum, participants were told the 100 Euros were in
their possession and they had to decide how much they were
willing to give to the other player. In the taking ultimatum, the
other player possessed the money and participants had to
indicate how much they wanted to take. Frames were
represented by figures picturing two people at a table with a
pile of coins either at the proposer’s or at the responder’s side
(cf. Leliveld et al., 2008). Participants in the low l (l" .1)
condition learned that if their offers were rejected, they would
earn only 10% of the proposed amount, whereas the other
player would still receive 90%. These percentages were
reversed in the high l condition.
Anticipated Emotions
After participants indicated their offers, we measured anticip-
ated emotions. Anticipated fear was assessed by three items
asking participants to rate the extent to which they would feel
‘‘afraid’’, ‘‘worried’’, and ‘‘nervous’’ (a" .81) about their
offer being rejected if they would have offered less. To
measure anticipated guilt, participants indicated to what extent
they would ‘‘feel guilty’’, ‘‘feel bad for what they did’’, and
‘‘regret their decision’’ (a" .90) in case they would have
offered less. All emotions were assessed on scales from 1 (not
at all) to 9 (extremely).
Manipulation Checks
To check the l manipulation, participants computed the
consequences of rejection for a hypothetical offer. To check the
ownership manipulation, participants indicated ‘‘who initially
owned the money’’, on a scale from 1 (I completely owned the




Four participants incorrectly computed the consequences of
rejection. Excluding them from analyses did not affect the
results. A l# ownership ANOVA on perceived ownership
revealed only a main effect of ownership F(1,119)" 6.17,
p" .003, h2" 0.06. Participants felt more entitled to the
money in the giving (M" 3.5, SD" 1.4) than in the taking
ultimatum (M" 4.5, SD" 1.6).
Ultimatum Offers
Average offers across experimental conditions are depicted in
Figure 1. A l# ownership ANOVA revealed significant main
effects of both the lmanipulation, F(1,119)" 10.08, p" .002,
h2" 0.08, and of the ownership manipulation, F(1,119)"
9.03, p" .003, h2" 0.07. The l# ownership interaction was
not significant. As predicted, offers were higher when l was
low (M" 37.8, SD" 16.1) than when l was high (M" 28.8,
SD" 16.7). Also in line with our expectations, proposers
Figure 1. Average offer ($SE) by proposers under conditions of
high or low concerns for rejection and of high or low concerns for
others (Study 1)
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offered less in the giving ultimatum (M" 28.9, SD" 16.9) and
more in the taking ultimatum (M" 37.4, SD" 16.0).
Anticipated Emotions
Mean levels of anticipated fear and guilt across experimental
conditions are reported in Table 1. A l# ownership ANOVA
on anticipated fear revealed only a significant main effect of
the l manipulation, F(1,119)" 13.76, p< .001, h2" 0.11,
indicating that participant anticipated more fear over lower
offers if l was low. An identical ANOVA on anticipated guilt
revealed only a significant main effect of the ownership
manipulation, F(1,119)" 6.06, p" .015, h2" 0.05, indicating
that participants anticipated more guilt over lower offers in the
taking ultimatum.
Mediation Analyses
Both anticipated fear (r119" .38, p< .001) and anticipated
guilt (r119" .37, p< .001) were positively correlated with
offer size. To test whether the effects of our manipulations
were indeed mediated by the predicted emotions, we used the
procedure prescribed by Barron and Kenny (1986). The effects
of both manipulations were dummy-coded, and their
interaction term was computed. Both main effects and the
interaction term were subsequently entered as predictors in a
regression analysis with offers as the dependent variable. We
subsequently entered anticipated emotions as additional
predictors and tested if the significant impact of the
manipulations on offers were reduced by inclusion of the
mediator. Separate regression models were used to test for the
mediating effects of anticipated fear and guilt. Finally, we also
computed the effect of each manipulation (and their
interaction) on anticipated fear and guilt. Results of these
analyses are summarized in Figures 2a and 2b.
As expected, feelings of anticipated fear, Sobel Z" 2.60,
p" .001 (but not guilt, Sobel Z"!0.66, ns), mediated the
impact of the l manipulation. Controlling for anticipated fear,
the l values no longer affected offers. Feelings of anticipated
guilt, Sobel Z" 2.26, p" .024 (but not fear, Sobel Z"!0.01,
ns), mediated the impact of the ownership manipulation.
Controlling for anticipated guilt, ownership no longer affected
offers.
Discussion
We investigated if anticipated fear and guilt affected ultimatum
offers by testing whether each emotion uniquely accounted for
the well-documented effects of manipulations of the standard
ultimatum game on proposers’ offers. We hypothesized that
feelings of anticipated fear over low offers would reflect the
extent to which proposers were concerned with avoiding
rejection of their offers in an ultimatum game. Therefore, we
expected that feelings of anticipated fear would mediate the
effects of a manipulation that varies the consequences of
rejection (i.e., the l manipulation). Feelings of anticipated
guilt on the other hand should reflect the extent to which
proposers were concerned with the other player’s outcome.
Therefore, we expected that feelings of anticipated guilt would
account for the effects of a manipulation that makes proposers
more concerned with the other’s outcome (i.e., the manipula-
tion of initial ownership). The results supported our predic-
tions. As shown in previous research, consequences of
rejection (Fellner & Güth, 2003) and initial ownership
(Leliveld et al., 2008) both affected ultimatum offers. Our
results showed that the former effect was driven by anticipated
fear of rejection. This suggests that anticipated fear connects to
concerns for rejection of the own outcome. Similarly, the effect
of ownership was driven by anticipated guilt. Hence, anticip-
ated guilt over inadequate offers reflects the extent to which
proposers take concerns for others into account.
These results offer initial support to the idea that feelings of
fear and guilt underlie offers in ultimatum bargaining. In Study
2, we elicited fear and guilt directly to see if this increased
offers in a similar fashion. Additionally, we used Study 2 to
examine the impact of feelings of fear and guilt in a setting
where decisions would have financial consequences.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we experimentally induced feelings of fear or guilt
in proposers and compared the effects thereof on ultimatum
offers to those of a control group of proposers in which no
Table 1. Mean ratings of anticipated fear and guilt under conditions








M SD M SD
Low Low 3.71 1.86 3.86 2.20
High 3.76 1.58 5.27 2.15
High Low 5.09 2.07 4.11 1.92
High 4.91 1.88 4.52 1.79
Figure 2. Summary of mediation analysis (a) by anticipated fear of the impact of high and low concerns for rejection, and (b) by anticipated
guilt of the impact of high and low concerns for others on ultimatum offers (Study 1). Note. Numbers represent standardized regression
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emotions were induced. We expected that direct inductions of
fear and guilt would also cause more generous ultimatum
offers, consistent with the effects of indirectly manipulating
anticipated fear and guilt through concerns for rejection and
for others.
It is our experience that the vast majority of undergraduate
students in the social sciences tend to offer equal splits.
Therefore, we used a variation of the standard ultimatum game
to enhance between-participants variance in ultimatum offers.
Hereto we introduced information asymmetry regarding the
amount of money that would be distributed. We told
participants that responders only knew the range but not the
exact amount of the endowment. Responders cannot be certain
as to what constitutes an equal split in such settings. This
introduces ambiguity about what amount to consider an
acceptable offer, and thereby more leeway to deviate from an
equal split (see for similar arguments about the connection
between information asymmetry and ambiguity (Wade-
Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996; Loewenstein &
Moore, 2003; van Dijk et al., 2008)). We anticipated that
(some) proposers would take advantage of this ambiguity by
making lower offers (for results of a similar manipulation see
Mitzkewitz & Nagel, 1993; Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996). This
should result in sufficient variance in offers to observe effects
of the induced emotions.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 63 undergraduate students (75.4% female,
Mage" 18.9 years, SD" 1.30), who came to the laboratory in
groups of about six to eight people. Participants were seated in
individual cubicles. The emotion-induction and the instruc-
tions and measures for the ultimatum game were presented
consecutively in a series of unrelated studies from different
researchers, which obscured their relation. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (Emotion:
Control vs. Fear vs. Guilt).
Emotion Induction
An autobiographical recall procedure was applied to induce
emotions (cf. De Hooge et al., 2007; Nelissen et al., 2007). The
task was presented as a study on ‘‘memory and information
processing’’. Participants were asked to ‘‘describe in as much
detail as possible’’ a recent event due to which they had felt
very much afraid or guilty. In the control condition, they were
asked to describe an ordinary day in their lives.
Ultimatum Offers
After the emotion induction, all participants received
instructions to the ultimatum game and an envelope containing
a number of chips. Each chip represented a value of 40
eurocents (about 0.60 US dollar). It was explained that they
had to divide the chips with another participant. Participants
were told that they could decide how to distribute the chips
between themselves and the other participant. The other
participant could then accept or reject their offer, with the same
consequences as in the standard ultimatum game. It was made
clear that at the end of the session, every participant would be
paid according to the outcome of this negotiation. In fact, all
participants were assigned to the role of proposer.
It was further explicated that the envelopes they received
contained a number between 10 and 25 chips. Participants
were led to believe that the other participant did not know the
exact number. All the other participant supposedly knew was
that they received an envelope containing a number of chips in
this range. In fact, all participants received 25 chips (making
for a total endowment ofs10). They put the number of chips
they wanted to give to the other participant in another
envelope, which they handed to the experimenter.
Emotion Manipulation Checks
After participants handed the envelopes back to the
experimenter they were asked to reread their written accounts
and to indicate how ‘‘guilty’’ and ‘‘afraid’’ they felt to check
for the effectiveness of the emotion-induction. To exclude the
possibility that potential effects were not due to feelings of fear
and guilt, but should instead be ascribed to negative affect in
general, participants also indicated how ‘‘bad’’ they felt. Items
were rated on an 11-point scale (0" not at all–10" very
strongly).
Debriefing
At the end of the session, all participants were first probed for
suspicion and debriefed about the objectives of the study. No
one expressed doubts about the authenticity of the interaction.
It was explained that everyone had played the role of proposer
and had received 25 chips. Subsequently, everyone was paid
the amount represented by the number of chips that they did
not give to the ‘other’ participant.1
Results and Discussion
Emotion Manipulation Checks
A one-way ANOVA revealed significant between-group
differences in participants’ ratings of fear, F(2, 74)" 46.14,
p< .001, h2" 0.56, and guilt F(2, 74)" 62.41, p< .001,
h2" 0.63, but not in ratings of negative affect in general, F(2,
74)" 2.28, ns. Confirming that the induction of fear was
successful, post-hoc least-squared difference (LSD) compari-
sons showed that participants in the fear condition were more
afraid (M" 8.56, SD" 1.98) than participants in the control
(M" 1.48, SD" 1.98) and guilt conditions (M" 4.00,
SD" 3.62), both ps< .01, and felt significantly more fear
than guilt, t(25)" 7.52, p< .001, or negative affect in general,
t(25)" 4.04, p< .001. Confirming that the induction of guilt
1This procedure may have caused the undesirable effect that participants could
have realized that their generosity actually benefited the experimenter rather
than another participant, which in retrospect we believe to be an undesirable
side-effect of this procedure.
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was successful, post-hoc (LSD) comparisons showed that
participants in the guilt condition felt more guilt (M" 9.08,
SD" 1.12) than participants in the control (M" 2.56,
SD" 2.35) and fear conditions (M" 2.64, SD" 3.17), both
ps< .001, and felt significantly more guilt than fear
t(24)" 8.03, p< .001, or general negative affect,
t(24)" 5.81, p< .001.
Ultimatum Offers
As predicted, participants in both the fear (M" 10.81,
SD" 1.44), and the guilt condition (M" 10.52, SD" 1.54)
made significantly higher offers than in the control condition
(M" 9.29, SD" 2.12), F(2, 63)" 4.62, p" .014, h2" 0.13.
Post-hoc (LSD comparisons revealed that offers were higher in
both the fear (p" .006) and the guilt condition (p" .024) were
higher than in the control condition. Hence, feelings of fear and
guilt increase proposers’ ultimatum offers.2 This shows that
inducing fear and guilt directly, produces the same effects as
eliciting both emotions indirectly through manipulations that
ostensibly affect the impact of strategic and non-selfish
motives.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Research on numerous manipulations of the standard
ultimatum game suggests that proposers anticipate the
implications of offers that responders consider to be
insufficient, and that this may elicit concerns for rejection
of the own outcome, as well as concerns for the other’s
outcome. However, we argued that one cannot conclusively
infer the impact of these concerns from only considering the
size of the ultimatum offer. Therefore, we redirected attention
to the impact of emotions to gain insight into the psychological
processes underlying ultimatum offers. We proposed that
feelings of anticipated fear over low offers reflect the extent to
which ultimatum proposals are motivated by concerns for
rejection of the own outcome, and that feelings of anticipated
guilt over inadequate offers reflect the extent to which
ultimatum proposals are motivated concerns for others.
In two experimental studies we obtained results that were
consistent with this idea. In Study 1, we found that anticipated
fear and guilt uniquely accounted for the effects of two well-
known manipulations of the standard ultimatum game.
Specifically, the effects of a l manipulation (Fellner & Güth,
2003) that varies the consequences of rejection to the proposer
were mediated by feelings of anticipated fear. Similarly, the
effects of a manipulation of initial ownership (Leliveld et al.,
2008) that varies the extent to which the responder’s concerns
are taken into account were mediated by anticipated guilt.
Study 2 corroborated the proposed role of fear and guilt by
showing that both feelings also have a direct effect, matching
that of the presumed underlying strategic and non-selfish
motives in producing more generous ultimatum offers.
Further Considerations about the Role of Emotions in
Ultimatum Bargaining
The present findings highlight the potential contribution of
studying the influence of specific emotions to reveal the nature
of the motives underlying behavior. We are aware of only a
single other study that also used affective measures to identify
the role of strategic and non-selfish motives in proposers’
offers (Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005). In this study, proposers
indicated their anticipated pleasure over a range of possible
payoffs (i.e., accepted offers) as well as their preference for
each of these offers. It was found that some proposers derived
pleasure from fairness, indicating highest preferences and
most pleasure for equal offers whereas their preference and
pleasure decreased as offers deviated from the 50–50 split.
Self-interested proposers showed similar preferences, yet their
pleasure linearly increased with the offer size. This latter
discrepancy suggests that preferences are based on strategic
considerations (or ‘‘strategic pleasure’’, cf. Haselhuhn &
Mellers, 2005).
We believe the present, emotion-specific approach has one
clear advantage to the use of affective rankings of offers in
determining proposers’ motives. The affective approach
presents a descriptive index as proposers’ motives are defined
by a certain relation of preferences and pleasures. Investigating
specific emotions on the other hand, provides a process
account of decision-making in ultimatum bargaining. This
allows for a priori predictions about the effects of manipulat-
ing the ultimatum game by specifying the consequences (i.e.,
elicitation or inhibition) of such manipulations for specific
emotions. If aggregated into a general measure of affect, such
effects can no longer be discerned.
We acknowledge that people’s predictions about their
feelings in different situations are unlikely to be completely
accurate. This does not compromise the present findings.
Throughout this paper we have shown that fear and guilt
systematically vary as a result of differences in the strength of
strategic and non-selfish motives. Whether or not, people’s
ratings of their feelings are completely accurate does not limit
their use as an index of these motives. Even a biased
thermometer can be used to measure differences in tempera-
ture.
One aspect that does deserve more detailed consideration,
however, is the simultaneous use of anticipated and directly
experienced emotions throughout our studies. It is generally
acknowledged in the field of emotions that our decisions and
behavior can be affected by our feelings in multiple ways (e.g.,
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Obviously, experienced
emotions may elicit behavior directly in accordance with
the central concern underlying the emotion (cf. Arnold, 1960;
Plutchik, 1980; Frijda, 1986; Roseman et al., 1994). This
process accounted for the effects observed in Study 2. Notably,
research indicates that such direct effects can emanate from
experienced emotions that are relevant to the decision at hand,
but also and with identical consequence, from emotions that
are the experiential residue of other incidents that bear no
relevance to the present decision (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).
Rather than directly, emotions may also affect behavior
through an anticipatory process that elicits affective outcomes
of different possible courses of action. The nature of the
anticipated emotional outcome that results from this anticip-
2We also ran this study with different payoffs. Similar patterns of results were
obtained if proposers were asked to divide 2 or 5 euros. This suggests that the
effects of fear and guilt on proposers’ offers are not dependent upon the size of
the endowment.
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atory process depends upon the particular concern that is
involved in the perceived consequence of a certain course of
action. Again, this concern is emotion specific. As we saw in
Study 1, variations in the decisions situation (i.e., different
consequences of rejection or differences in initial ownership)
affect the perceived implication of a certain course of action (a
low offer) for a particular concern (i.e., for the own or the
others outcome), which in turn affects the intensity of the
anticipated feeling (fear or guilt) that is elicited. These
anticipated emotions then affect the actual decision in a
similar, goal-congruent direction as experienced emotions do.
So, even though the nature of the cognitive process underlying
the behavioral effects of direct and anticipated emotions is
different, the results are ultimately identical.
On a final note, we wish to stress that we by no means claim
that fear and guilt are the only relevant emotions in ultimatum
bargaining. Several studies have already demonstrated that
other emotions, such as regret (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997),
and gratitude (Tsang, 2006) affect offers in ultimatum games.
We would also expect that feelings of empathy (cf. Batson,
2006) and of anger towards the other player (cf. Pillutla &
Murnighan, 1996) are important in negotiations. Moreover,
recent studies show that emotions expressed by the interaction
partner may affect the outcome of negotiations by eliciting
reciprocal or antagonistic affective reactions (e.g., van Kleef,
De Dreu, &Manstead, 2006; van Dijk et al., 2008). Ultimatum
offers are determined in concert by strategic considerations
that make proposers avoid rejection, and non-selfish con-
siderations that make proposers consider the other’s outcome
as well. Other emotions moderate the impact of concerns for
rejection and the self, or bring additional motives to the mix.
However, fear and guilt merit special attention as they are the
only two emotions that specifically and directly relate to the
motives that are intrinsic to decisions in the ultimatum game.
The present study strictly focused on the proposers’ side of
ultimatum bargaining. Prior research has shown that respon-
ders tend to reject unequal, small offers. Whether or not
concerns for others are involved in responders’ decisions to
accept or reject offers is equally subjected to debate (e.g.,
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996, 2003). Recent research indicates
that emotions are also useful to identify responders’ motives.
Specifically, it seems that concerns for fair treatment appear to
be related to responders’ feelings of anger, whereas
responders’ concerns for others’ outcomes are also related
to feelings of guilt (Nelissen & van Someren, 2009).
CONCLUSION
As stated, the present data illustrate the potential contribution
of examining emotions to obtain an indication of the motives
involved in ultimatum bargaining. The main reason for looking
into the role of emotions in ultimatum bargaining was our
conviction that we cannot exclusively infer motives from
ultimatum offers alone, nor from changes in average offers due
to various structural manipulations of the ultimatum game. By
establishing that feelings of fear and guilt relate uniquely to
concerns for rejection and to concerns for other people, the
present data point out a clear distinction between knowledge
about fairness and actual concerns for others (cf. Haidt, 2003).
That is, proposers who make generous ultimatum offers
because they fear rejection do recognize that responders may
evaluate their offer in terms of fairness criteria. Strategic
considerations imply that the proposer is aware of and
understands these criteria. Fear and fairness considerations are
inextricably linked in that respect. However, the present data
illustrate that fairness is not only about the understanding of a
set of social norms or rules, but also about the specific feeling
(i.e., guilt instead of fear) that accompanies their violation.
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